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Bad Times, Good Credit
Banks’ limited knowledge about borrowers’ creditworthiness constitutes an
important friction in credit markets. Is this friction deeper in recessions,
thereby contributing to cyclical swings in credit, or is the friction reduced,
as bad times reveal information about firm quality? We test these alter-
native hypotheses using internal ratings data from a large Swedish cross-
border bank and credit scores from a credit bureau. The ability to clas-
sify corporate borrowers by credit quality is greater during bad times and
worse during good times. Soft and hard information measures both display
countercyclical patterns. Our results suggest that information frictions in
corporate credit markets are intrinsically countercyclical and not due to
cyclical variation in monitoring effort. The presence of countercyclical
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information frictions provides a rationale for countercyclical provisions or
capital in banks to smooth credit cycles.
JEL codes: G21, E32
Keywords: credit markets, corporate loans, information frictions, internal
ratings, business cycles, credit cycles, credit ratings
“Only when the tide goes out do you discover who is not wearing swim trunks”
Ascribed to Warren Buffett, CEO of Berkshire Hathaway
Credit is the main form of financing for firms—funding operations, working
capital, investment, and acquisitions. The flow of credit to firms is highly cyclical:
in recessions, the volume of new credit is low and loan spreads are high. There is a
long-standing concern that depressed credit flows in recessions reflect a low supply
of credit: some friction reduces the availability of loans at bad times, thereby exac-
erbating business cycles (see, e.g., Bagehot 1873).1 In this paper, we examine if one
important friction—variation in the quality of lenders’ information about borrowers
default risk—drives cyclical swings in the credit supply.
Information frictions are perceived as central to understanding many features of
credit markets, including the formation of long-term relationships between borrowers
and lenders (Petersen and Rajan 1994, Agarwal and Hauswald 2010), the existence of
credit registries (Pagano and Japelli 1993, Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisini 2010),
the use of covenants in debt contracts (Smith and Warner 1979), and the calibration
of financial incentives to loan officers (Agarwal and Ben-David 2018). Information
frictions have been identified as important to both quantities (Garmaise and Natividad
2010, 2017) and prices (Ivashina 2009) in credit markets.
Given the well-established importance of information frictions, it is natural to ask
if they also contribute to credit market cycles.2 Information frictions can potentially
be more or less severe in cyclical downturns, and available theories point in both
directions.
On the one hand, some theories suggest that information problems between lenders
and borrowers are less severe in downturns. Such countercyclicality of information
frictions can be the result of several underlying mechanisms. Banks may exert more
effort in recessions (Ruckes 2004) or face fewer hard-to-classify new borrowers in
recessions (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006); loan officers can also become more
1. Recent evidence for cyclical variation in the credit supply is diverse. Dell’Ariccia, Detragiache,
and Rajan (2008) use cross-sector variation to document the cyclical nature of credit supply. Chava and
Purnanandam (2011), Jiménez et al. (2012), and Peek and Rosengren (1997) document large contractions
in the corporate credit supply associatedwith theAsian crisis in 1997, the recent financial crisis, and Japan’s
stock market collapse in the early 1990s, respectively. Jiménez et al. (2017b) show that supply effects
stemming from bank balance sheet strength drive credit in crisis times, while demand effects originating
in firm balance sheet strength affect credit in both good and crisis times.
2. Information frictions include asymmetric information between borrower and lender about borrower
quality (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981), asymmetric information between banks (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez
2006), and ex ante uncertainty about an individual project’s future payoff (Townsend 1979, Gale and
Hellwig 1985).
BO BECKER, MARIEKE BOS, AND KASPER ROSZBACH : 109
risk-averse in bad periods (Cohn et al. 2015) or see their skills deteriorate in low-
default periods because there is less feedback (Berger and Udell 2004).
On the other hand, another set of models suggests information frictions are more
severe in bad times. Kurlat (2013), for example, finds that a reduction in investment
opportunities increases information frictions, which generates a feedback to growth.
Ordonez (2013) and Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) also model economies where wors-
ening information frictions contribute to cyclical downturns.
In this paper, we examine directly how the quality of banks’ information about their
corporate borrowers varies throughout the cycle. We use data from one large Swedish
cross-border bankmatchedwith a national credit register that has been used in, among
others, Cerqueiro, Ongena, andRoszbach (2016) andNakamura andRoszbach (2018)
and examine how the information content of its borrower credit quality assessments
(i.e., the ability to predict future defaults and bankruptcies) varies over time. Our data
provide detailed information on the bank’s corporate borrowers through two business
cycles, allowing us to separately examine the financial crisis and a second, less severe
recession. We do not study how information frictions affect either lending decisions
or lending standards. Our tests only examine the quality of the bank’s information
about clients, not how that information is used.
The bank we study follows the Basel II Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) approach and
employs an internal rating system to summarize information about the credit quality
of its borrowers. A key element in our tests consists of comparing the precision of
internal ratings over the cycle. First, we find that the bank is better able to predict
future defaults in business cycle downturns. Specifically, using different metrics, the
bank’s internal ratings have greater explanatory power in predicting defaults during
recessions than at other times. Defaults are more concentrated among firms to which
the bank assigned poor ratings during a recession than in good times. This finding
is robust to using different measures of borrower information and various subsets of
borrowers. Among other things, we show that the occurrence of sluggish updating
of ratings by some loan officers, which may cause ratings in bad times to contain
information produced in good times, is not driving our results. The fact that defaults
are best predicted in recessions rejects several theories that argue business cycles are
enhanced or driven by greater information frictions in recessions.
We attempt to differentiate between the different theories of countercyclical infor-
mation problems that could explain our finding of countercyclical information quality.
First, we assess a testable implication of Dell’Ariccia andMarquez (2006). In their
theory, more new borrowers enter the bank’s pool of clients in good times, thereby
reducing the precision of internal ratings. We find that our results are not driven by
shifts in the mix of new and old borrowers.
We also consider Ruckes’s (2004) theory, which suggests that bankswill exert more
effort to avoid defaults at times when they are costlier (i.e., recessions). Lisowsky,
Minnis, and Sutherland (2016) have earlier provided evidence fromU.S. construction
loans that banks collect fewer financial statements from small borrowers in bad times.
We use information on the timing of the bank’s revisions of borrower ratings instead
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of effort data and find that monitoring activity is not cyclical. Increased monitoring
activity in recessions is therefore not driving our findings.
Last, we examine Berger and Udell’s (2004) proposed mechanism: loan officer
skills deteriorate (and lending institutions forget lessons learned in recessions) as
time passes, resulting in progressively lower quality of credit analysis in expansions.
By exploiting data on mechanical credit scores (CR), which do not rely on effort,
we reveal a similar variation in the precision of mechanical CR as for loan officers’
ratings. This suggests a deterioration of skills cannot drive all of the time series pat-
terns. As an auxiliary finding, we establish that soft information—included in internal
ratings but excluded from mechanical CR—is a more powerful predictor of defaults
than hard information during bad times.
We also examine how different types of information contribute to cyclical patterns.
Evidence suggests that both hard information captured in credit bureau scores, and
soft, private information (not captured by such variables) are stronger predictors of
defaults in recessions.
Overall, our results imply that the bank we study is best able to predict loan defaults
in business cycle downturns, a pattern consistent with information frictions being
countercyclical, that is, weaker in recessions. The improvement in the bank’s sorting
ability and the reduction in information frictions in corporate credit markets during
recessions are robust and intrinsic properties. Our findings do not lend support to
theories in which information frictions in credit markets play a role in recessions but
are broadly consistent with models of poor lending decisions in expansions.3
Our paper complements the literature that sees information frictions as key to credit
markets and is closely related to the line of research that investigates why credit mar-
kets are procyclical. We show that information frictions between banks and their bor-
rowers cannot explain the procyclicality of credit flows, and in fact work in the oppo-
site direction. As a consequence, other frictions must be driving the observed patterns
in the supply of corporate credit. Such frictions may be located in the financial sys-
tem: a low loan supply in recessions (see Kashyap, Stein, and Wilcox 1993, Becker
and Ivashina 2014) may reflect the impairment or weakness of the institutions that
intermediate loans (Holmström and Tirole 1997) or incentive problems facing bank
managers (Rajan 1992, Ivashina and Scharfstein 2010, Myerson 2012). Benmelech,
Meisenzahl, and Ramcharan (2017), Jiménez et al. (2012), and Khwaja and Mian
(2008), Chodorow-Reich (2014) provided different complementary evidence that fi-
nancial institutions’ capital and willingness to bear risk are important toeconomic
cycles. Another category of explanations involves agency problems between lenders
and borrowers. Agency problems can become more severe in recessions if corpo-
rate losses reduce equity values (Bernanke and Gertler 1989) or if asset values fall
(Kiyotaki and Moore 1997).
3. Our results do not speak to uncertainty about aggregate states (see, e.g., Bloom 2007, Caballero and
Simsek 2013, Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel 2014, and Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek
2014). It may be the case that sorting corporate borrowers by credit quality is, in fact, easier in recessions,
but that uncertainty about economic growth is simultaneously high.
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Our paper is also related to the literature on credit ratings, which, like internal
ratings, measure credit risk. Dilly and Mählmann (2015) document that ratings agen-
cies’ incentive conflicts vis-à-vis investors are stronger in boom periods and lead to
a bias and lower quality of initial ratings for corporate bonds. In boom times, rating
agencies hold a more optimistic view than bond markets and boom bond ratings are
more heavily downgraded, consistent with the notion that information frictions are
less severe in bad times.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on countercyclical capital loan loss
reserves and requirements. Jiménez et al. (2017a) show that countercyclical provi-
sioning smooths credit supply cycles. Our findings provide an empirical rationale
for why countercyclical loan loss reserves or capital requirements may have such an
effect.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data
and variables. Section 2 presents our main results. Section 3 distinguishes different
mechanisms that may be driving our results. Section 4 offers some robustness tests.
Section 5 concludes.
1. DATA AND VARIABLES
For our analysis, we use a comprehensive database of all corporate accounts of one
of the four largest Swedish cross-border banks that followed the international stan-
dards of Basel Committee’s IRB approach for classification of its borrowers (hence-
forth, “the bank”). The bank is a universal bank with a loan portfolio that resembles
that of the other major banks in Sweden. The database contains all loan files the bank
maintains for each borrower in Sweden at a monthly frequency between 2004:01 and
2012:12. As our main unit of analysis, we use borrowers rather than individual loans,
following the structure of the bank’s own risk measurement. Although our panel is
unbalanced in a strict sense, it displays most features of a balanced panel because
of very low entry and attrition rates for borrower relationships. Of 16,702 firms in
our main sample, only 523 exit at some point. This means that 3.1% of firms ever
exit during the whole 9-year sample, corresponding to an average exit rate of around
0.35% per year.
We supplement the bank’s data with annual accounting information from Statistics
Sweden and information from UC AB, the Swedish leading credit bureau, which is
jointly owned by the largest Swedish banks. The credit bureau data include the firms’
payment histories and the credit bureau’s assessment of the firms’ credit risk.4 We
summarize our data set in two tables: Table 1 lists all variables and their source data
set, and Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for each variable for the sample used
in our baseline regressions (equation (1)).
4. Jacobson, Lindé, and Roszbach (2006) and Nakamura and Roszbach (2010) describe the credit
bureau’s modeling.
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1.1 Borrower and Loan Data
The bank’s main measure of credit quality is the internal rating (IR). The credit risk
model used by the bank is based onmultiple data sources including credit ratings from
a credit bureau, borrower income statements, balance sheet information, and other
(soft) information (Nakamura andRoszbach 2018). Only borrowers towhich the bank
has a total exposure above a certain predetermined threshold are assigned an internal
rating by a loan officer.5 Smaller borrowers only have an automated behavioral rating
that is not available to us. Borrowers with an IR represent between 70% and 80%
of loans outstanding, depending on the year. Although loan officers are required to
review client files and update client information at least once a year, IR values are
stable over time: on average, 2% of firms change category from one quarter to next.
We assign the different rating grades (one to seven, with each class having a plus and
minus) values from 1 to 21, where 1 is the worst rating (highest default risk).
We follow conventions in international banking regulation and use the occurrence
of a borrower default in the next 12 months as the baseline outcome measure in our
tests of information quality. The bank’s internal default variable equals one when any
payment is over 90 days past due.6 Because defaults are sometimes resolved quickly
and at a limited loss for the bank, we also use bankruptcy filings in the next 12 or
24 months as an alternative dependent variable. Bankruptcy is less frequent than de-
fault but typically more severe and more likely to be a terminal state than default is.
In our data, bankruptcies constitute a subset of default events (58% of default events
are also bankruptcies in our sample).
In Table 3, we report data demonstrating how firms differ across IR (grouped into
bins for expositional purposes). The table shows average default and bankruptcy rates
and loss given default. Both default and bankruptcy rates, at either horizon, are high-
est for the bin with IRs between one and three. The worst-rated borrowers also have
the highest loss given default rates. These borrowers are thus much riskier than better-
rated firms but cover only a small part of the bank’s loan portfolio. Most of the bank’s
credit losses are therefore caused through defaults of firms with a somewhat better
rating. The default risk of relatively safe firms is therefore key to understanding the
precision of the bank’s information. Panel B of the table also provides data on the
number of loans per firm, the share of loans that are secured with collateral, the av-
erage loan maturity, and the average interest rate for each IR category.
During our sample period, the bank used internal ratings to allocate capital at
the company level, but not to internally price funding to loan officers who con-
sidered granting a loan or to set the interest rate on a loan that was to be granted,
that is, loan officers had full freedom to set interest rate margins. This greatly
limited the incentives for false reporting by loan officers, as in Berg, Puri, and
Rocholl (2016). To the best of our knowledge, there was no other systematic feed-
back mechanism to loan officers based on internal rating allocations at the bank.
5. This threshold does not vary over the business cycle. To protect the identity of the bank, we cannot
publish the threshold.
6. This definition of loan default follows international standards.
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TABLE 3















1–3 16% 24% 75% 11% 1.4%
4–6 9.2% 14% 61% 4.7% 0.30%
7–9 3.5% 6.3% 58% 1.5% 3.2%
10–12 1.4% 2.7% 55% 0.37% 26%
13–15 0.90% 1.7% 54% 0.097% 46%
16–18 0.60% 1.2% 42% 0.034% 19%
19–21 0.70% 1.1% 23% 0.000% 4.5%
ALL 1.5% 2.6% 51% 0.47% 100%











1–3 1 6.2% 1.9 4.6%
4–6 2 9.5% 1.9 5.2%
7–9 2 9.3% 2.1 4.8%
10–12 2 11% 2.3 4.5%
13–15 2 11% 2.0 4.1%
16–18 2 18% 2.3 4.0%
19–21 2 5.4% 2.2 3.7%
Notes: This table summarizes full sample averages on credit, default, and losses by internal rating (IR). Default is the share of firm-quarters
where a default is reported within the next 12 and 24 months, respectively. Default frequency, credit-weighted reports the fraction of outstand-
ing credit that experiences a default. Loss given default is total observed losses divided by total credit outstanding at time of default, for the
whole sample. Share of aggregate credit losses refers to borrowers with an internal rating.
However, we cannot fully exclude the possibility that some informal incentive struc-
tures
existed.
To attenuate any residual risk that loan officers systematically misclassified bor-
rowers, and because banks’ decision making could potentially be based on differ-
ent metrics than their internal ratings or on some soft information to which we lack
access, we construct an alternative measure of the bank’s assessment of a borrow-
ers’ creditworthiness. We call this “credit slack” and base it on the bank’s (privately
known) borrower specific willingness to lend more than it is currently doing, that
is, an internal lending limit. This measure reasonably incorporates all soft and hard
information, is not at risk of being manipulated and is available for more borrowers
than IR. We refer to Appendix 1 for details on the construction of credit slack. Some
of the results using credit slack that we refer to in Sections 2, 3, and 4 be presented
in Appendix 2.
In addition to the bank’s internal risk assessments, we also use an external risk
assessment, made by the credit bureau. This rating is generated for all Swedish in-
corporated firms by a statistical model that uses only hard information that is available
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from government agencies like district courts and the tax authority. The credit bureau
ratings are available to loan officers at near zero cost.7
1.2 Macro Data
Sweden has no official recession dating committee nor does it publish an official re-
cession indicator. We therefore construct an indicator variable for recessions based on
stock market and GDP growth. For GDP, we use the seasonally adjusted real growth
rate, measured at quarterly frequency; for the stock market we use the 12-month re-
turn on the OMX30 stockmarket index, a market value-weighted price index of the 30
most actively traded stocks on the Stockholm Stock Exchange. The two time-series
variables are highly positively correlated with each other (0.73) and with consumer
confidence measures of the business cycle (0.70 and 0.51 for GDP growth and stock
market return, respectively). The recession indicator takes value one when either the
trailing 12-month stock return or the real GDP growth is negative.
Figure 1 displays the two indicators and our recession dummy (shaded areas) over
the sample period. During our sample period, Sweden experienced a steep but short
recession in 2008 and 2009 (negative GDP growth in 2008Q1, 2008Q4, and 2009Q1)
and a second, milder, slowdown from mid-2011 to mid-2013 (negative growth in
2011Q3, 2012Q3, and 2013Q2).
1.3 Monitoring
We construct different measures of the bank’s monitoring activity. These measures
are based on the frequency with which the bank reviews a borrower’s files and
possibly revises either the client’s credit rating or credit limit, reassesses collateral
values, or makes other changes to the client’s credit terms. Internal rules require loan
officers to review each client’s file at least once every 12 months. The average time
between two monitoring events is slightly above 10 months and it varies from 1 to
24 months. Long time gaps are rare: only 2.1% of firm-month observations exceed
the 12-month limit since their last reported monitoring.
2. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section, we report tests of competing hypotheses regarding the cyclical prop-
erties of banks’ internal credit ratings. We employ a range of tests that aim to capture
how informative bank internal ratings are about default risk.
A natural starting point is running predictive regressions with internal ratings
(IR) as independent variable, to assess the extent to which internal ratings have a
basic ability to predict loan defaults and default risk differs between borrowers with
7. Generally, we think of public information as being a subset of all hard information, while private
information can consist of both hard and soft information. In the remainder of this paper, we will only use
the concepts hard and soft.
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Fig 1. The Swedish Business Cycle, 2004–14.
Notes: This figure displays two time-series measures of Sweden’s business cycle. The last 12 months’ stock return refers
to the OMX30 index of the largest 30 stocks bymarket capitalization, and quarterly GDP growth rate is seasonally adjusted
real GDP growth.
different values of internal ratings. Later, we compare the estimated coefficient on IR
in expansions and recessions as a way of assessing how much ex ante default risk can
be expected to differ for borrowers with different values of internal ratings. A caveat
is that we need to make our measure scale-free in the sense of not mechanically
producing higher coefficients in periods of high average defaults. We achieve this by
using a probit regression model instead of ordinary least squares (OLS).8
In Section 2.1, we document the basic relationship between the bank’s internal
measure of borrower creditworthiness and default risk.9 In Section 2.2, we present
initial, nonparametric, and graphical evidence on the informativeness of internal
8. Probit coefficients are essentially multiplicative, and so are not mechanically affected by whether
they are estimated in high- or low-default risk periods. Another advantage of probit models over linear
probability models is that they are better at fitting the very small probabilities of defaults and bankruptcy
in some rating categories.
9. One drawback of t-statistics is that they tend to be higher in large samples, or, put differently, even
small effects can be precisely estimated in large samples. Small differences in default risk may not be
economically interesting in this setting.
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ratings over the business cycle. In Section 2.3, we present regression analyses that
confirm the countercyclicality of information frictions.
2.1 The Relationship between Internal Ratings and Default
We start by documenting the basic relationship between the bank’s measure of
creditworthiness and borrowers’ likelihood of default. We estimate probit regressions
as follows:
Defaultt+s = β1.IRt + β2.Controlst + Time Fixed Effects + et. (1)
We estimate equation (1) for defaults within 12 or 24 months (s = 12 or s = 24).10
Control variables capturing accounting-based measures of firm performance as well
as the firm’s credit bureau score and various characteristics of the loan contract are
included.
Results for both horizons, with and without controls, are reported in Table 4.11
In each specification, the bank’s information variables are significant and have the
expected negative sign, that is, better quality borrowers have lower default probability.
In column (1), we first leave out all controls except for time fixed effects to de-
termine if IR, on its own, predicts default. It indeed does. In columns (2) and (4),
we next include control variables, to verify whether IR has predictive power for bor-
rower default over and above the hard information captured in historic accounting
data, payment remarks, and the credit bureau’s CR. This is close to asking whether
IR reflects soft information that loan officers have and is not captured in the “hard”
control variables. The rating variable (IR) again predicts default and has a highly
statistically significant coefficient. The estimated marginal effect of IR, evaluated at
the mean of the dependent variable (i.e., around 1.5% default risk), implies that a
three-grade increase in the rating, slightly less than one standard deviation (3.6), is
associated with a reduction in the likelihood of default from 1.50% to 1.19%, or a
21% reduction. In column (6), we present the same regression run on a subsample
of firms that had their rating updated in the period before. The coefficient on IR and
Pseudo R2 are slightly higher than in column (2), illustrating that slow updating of
ratings reduces their predictive power.
Because default rates rise convexly as IR falls (Table 3) estimating a linear rela-
tionship between internal ratings and default may be econometrically inefficient. To
allow for a more efficient, flexible, functional form, we also fit a polynomial on IR
(with only time FE) and use the fitted value from this regression instead of IR in the
regressions underlying column (2) of Table 4. Column (7) of Table 4 displays this
regression, while column (8) presents the marginal effects. The estimated coefficient
on the IR polynomial is significantly different from zero and maintains its negative
10. We have employed a range of alternative econometric models to assess the relationship between
default and internal ratings. These include survival models with various distributional assumptions and
replacing the default indicator with a bankruptcy indicator. These are not reported but can be obtained
from the authors. Results are qualitatively very similar to those in Table 4.
11. Results for the 24-month horizon without controls are displayed in the Table A1.
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sign.12 Although pseudo-R2s do not allow for a precise comparison, the explanatory
power of the regressions does not appear to rise substantially when introducing the
polynomial.13 The linear probit regression approach used in Table 4, columns (1)–
(6) and forward is thus a reasonable approximation. In the Appendix, we show that a
specification with dummy variables for each rating grades qualitatively has the same
properties.
In columns (9) and (10), we also test if two alternative measures of borrower qual-
ity, “credit slack” and the CR constructed by the credit bureau have similar properties
as IR. Both display the same qualitative relationship with future loan defaults and
have quantitatively similar explanatory power. In Section 2.3, 3, and 4, we will use
these alternative information measures to test if the cyclical properties of information
frictions are specific to the bank’s own ratings or a robust feature of a broader set up
creditworthiness assessments.
The above results show that IR is an economically and statistically significant pre-
dictor of default, with and without controlling for hard information such as account-
ing data. The connection between future defaults and the bank’s assessments of its
borrowers suggest (i) that the bank has some ability to predict defaults and (ii) that
IR captures meaningful parts of the bank’s internal information. In addition, since
we control for a fairly large set of accounting-based variables and the credit bureau
score, the residual effect of IR can reasonably be considered “soft” information in the
sense of Berger et al. (2005).
2.2 Information Frictions over the Business Cycle
In this subsection, we turn to the cyclical patterns in informational frictions that
are our primary object of interest. Our main tests investigate the time-series variation
in the informativeness of IR. In subsections of 2.2, we use several nonparametric and
graphical techniques to visually assess the informativeness of IR over the business
cycle and present initial evidence that information frictions are countercyclical.
Predictive accuracy of the internal ratings. To measure the predictive performance
of the IR variable, we first use Moody’s (2003) concept of “accuracy curves.” An ac-
curacy curve plots the proportion of defaults accounted for by firms below a certain
rating (y-axis) against the proportion of the firm population that are below the same
rating (x-axis). An accurate rating system is one where most defaults occur for firms
with low ratings and few defaults occur for firms with high ratings. In such a case, the
12. The polynomial does allow us to better flesh out marginal effects. A one-standard-deviation in-
crease in IR around the median IR (13) is, for example, associated with a 1.2% reduction of the default
likelihood (from 1.04% to 1.02%). Because of the shape of the IR polynomial, this effect is much larger
for riskier firms. Dropping from the second worst into the worst IR group (from IR = 5 to IR = 2), while
holding all control variables fixed, default probability increases from 4.9% to 16.3%. Transitioning from
the third worst to the second worst IR group (i.e., from IR = 8 to IR = 5) is associated with an increase
in default probability from 2.0% to 4.9%, while moving from the fourth worst to the third worst IR group
(i.e., from IR = 11 to IR = 8) is associated with an increase from 1.18% to 1.97%.
13. Because the number of observations varies between model specifications in Table 4 the models
are not nested and pseudo R2 values cannot be compared directly.
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Fig 2. Accuracy of Internal Ratings by Year, 2004–11.
Notes: This figure shows 1-year cumulative accuracy profiles for the bank’s internal ratings for each year from 2004
to 2011. The accuracy curve is computed using Moody’s (2003) method and maps the proportion of defaults within 12
months that are accounted for by firms with the same or a lower rating (y-axis) with the proportion of all firms with the
same or a lower rating (x-axis).
accuracy curve will be close to the upper left corner of the graph. Greater accuracy
can arise because of a shift in defaults between rating grades for a given aggregate
default rate or through a combination of a shift between rating grades and an increase
in the aggregate default rates. A multiplicative change in default rates across rating
grades would not change accuracy of the rating system. Accuracy rates are there-
fore unaffected by aggregate conditions that influence default rates “proportionally”
across the risk spectrum. Completely random assignment of ratings (i.e., uninforma-
tive ratings) would produce an accuracy curve along the 45° line because defaults
are equally likely at all ratings levels. We construct accuracy curves for ratings at
year-end for all years in the sample, with a 12-month forward default horizon, and
plot these annual curves in Figure 2. Clearly, ratings have a lot of predictive power
in general. In particular, the recession years 2008, 2009, and 2011, have three of the
highest accuracy ratios. At this point, we will not try to explain in detail if the increase
in accuracy is driven primarily by the higher risk segment or by a broader range of
borrowers. Instead we suffice by observing that the increase in accuracy can be con-
sidered as prima facie evidence that the bank’s information may be more precise in
bad times. Later, we will return to a measure of accuracy in a regression setting.
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Considering our quarterly data at annual frequencies disregards a lot of the varia-
tion in accuracy rates, however. Moreover, our visual comparison does not work well
when showing too many curves at once. Therefore, we next consider a way of plotting
precision over time.
Survival rates by rating grade over time. As described earlier, our sample of firms is
largely stable over time, with few firms dropping out of the panel. To deal with any
possible bias caused by selection on disappearance, we use Kaplan–Meier survival
rates to examine the fine time-series variation in default rates across the various inter-
nal ratings. The Kaplan–Meier estimator is a nonparametric estimate of the survival
function S(t ) (and the corresponding hazard function) using the empirical estimator
Ŝ(t):
Ŝ (tk ) = nk − hk
nk
, (2)
where tk is the kth lowest survival time, nk is the number of “at risk” observations
at time tk, that is, firms that have not defaulted by that time and have not left the
sample for other reasons, and hk is the number of defaults at that time.14 Figure 3
displays the 12- and 24-month survival rates for the four intermediate internal rating
groups, obtained by combining three adjacent IRs into one group, quarter by quar-
ter until 2011Q1. We exclude the weakest rating category to keep the scale small
enough so that changes are visible. Borrowers with the best ratings have the lowest
default frequencies in all periods, while the two strongest categories show little vis-
ible variation. Survival rates display a clear business cycle pattern with rates falling
for all categories during both recessions. During downturns, the difference in sur-
vival rates between rating categories tends to increase. In other words, the difference
in default risk between firms positioned in adjacent ratings categories is largest in
recessions. This suggests that the bank’s ratings are most informative about risk in
recessions.
Relative default risk. A potential concern, when comparing absolute differences in
default risk, as in subsection “Parametric estimates of cyclicality,” is that when default
rates rise, these absolute differences may increase mechanically increase, even if the
sorting of risks does not improve in a relative sense. To address this concern, we next
gauge the precision of the bank’s borrower sorting by comparing the relative default
rates of different rating grades over time.
For this purpose, we merge observations into two groups of approximately equal
size, one consisting of firms with the three best ratings and another containing the
14. Firms can exit the data without a default event when they repay their loans (for example, because
the firm changes banks).
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Fig 3. Kaplan–Meier Survival Rates by Internal Rating.
Notes: This figure displays the survival rate, with 95% confidence intervals, for four internal rating categories. Panel
A uses a 12-month default window and Panel B a 24-month window. The Kaplan–Meier estimator is the maximum




, and ni is the number of survivors less the number of losses (censored
cases). Only surviving cases (have not yet been censored) are “at risk” of an (observed) default.
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next three grades.15 We then define the default ratio (DR) as the default frequency for
the weak group divided by the default frequency for the overall sample:






Here,Dmeasures the number of defaults andNi the number of firms in group i, and
strong and weak are labels for the two groups. This DR has two attractive properties.
If the ratings are completely uninformative about default risk, the default frequency
will be the same for the two ratings categories, andDR reaches its lower bound, that is,
one.16 If the discriminatory power of the ratings is maximal and all defaults occur in
the “weaker” category ( Dstrong = 0), DR simplifies into Nweak+NstrongNweak and thus reaches
its upper bound of two.
In Figure 4, we show that DR is on average 1.42 during expansions and statistically
significantly lower than during recessions (1.60).17 This corresponds to the default
rate among weak firms rising from 2.5 times to four times that of strong firms. In
other words, in recessions, defaults are more concentrated among firms to which the
bank assigned poor ratings than in good times. This result confirms that the bank’s
ability to assess credit risk appears strongly countercyclical.
The precision of bank ratings, and the gain in precision during bad times, can stem
from hard or soft information, since ratings are constructed using both types of infor-
mation. To discriminate between these two drivers of precision (gains), we also plot
DR computed with the credit bureau’s statistical CR, which is constructed using hard
information only. Interestingly, the precision of CR is also countercyclical. Its average
DR is 1.44 during expansions and 1.53 during recessions, a statistically significant
increase in precision, although only half that for IR.18 Both hard and soft information
measures thus display the same countercyclical variation in precision. Our results
thus suggest that changes in loan officer behavior (Berger and Udell 2004, Ruckes
2004, Cohn et al. 2015)), such as variation in monitoring effort (Ruckes 2004), alone
cannot explain the reduction of information frictions in recessions.
A potential concern is that sample selection could drive these results, because from
the pool of borrowers could be “unfavorable” in good times. To verify if this is feasible
for entry and attrition rates that are consistent with the total turnover rate in the loan
15. For firms with IR = 7, default is typically imminent and prediction is therefore not a challenge.
We therefore drop this category. Results are qualitatively unchanged, however, with this category included.
We also varied the methodology by using finer categories based on qualifiers to internal ratings (“pluses”
and “minuses”) and by letting the cutoff vary by quarter, in order to make sure that the two groups are of
equal size. We also used Kaplan–Meier adjusted default rates. Results are very similar.
16. In a perverse scenario where defaults are less frequent for weak than for strong, the ratio is smaller
than one. However, it would then make sense to switch the labels of the categories, and the ratio then would
not be below one.
17. Based on the time-series standard deviation of the ratio, the difference of 0.18 has a t-statistic of
7.30). The t-stat using Newey–West standard errors that allow for four autocorrelation terms is 5.0.
18. Assuming time-series independence, the t-statistic is 12.9, and allowing for four autocorrelation
terms, the t-statistic is 8.7.
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Fig 4. Default Rates across Ratings Categories.
Notes: This figure shows the relative default rates for firms of high and low credit quality. The whole line represents the
12-month default rate for the top half of firms, based on the bank’s internal rating categories, relative to the overall default
rate (the lowest ratings category is excluded). The dashed line shows the same ratio using only credit bureau scores to sort
firms. Shaded areas indicate recession periods (either trailing 12-month stock return is negative or nominal GDP growth
is negative, or both). The dotted lines represent averages for recessions and expansions, respectively.
portfolio of 3% over the full sample period, we perform a numerical exercise and
test the sensitivity of the DR to variation in the attrition rate. In Appendix 2, we show
that attrition which asymmetrically affects firms in better and worse rating grades can
only explain about 5% of the increase in the bank ratings’ precision from 1.42 to 1.6
between expansion and recession times. Empirically realistic amounts of selection
bias in our sample can thus not explain the business cycle patterns in information
asymmetries we observe, even if we assume extreme selection of firms that leave our
sample.19
Next, we turn to regression specifications that deal with potential concerns that the
absence control variables or the lack of attention for incorrectly classified nondefaults
19. Even with 20% attrition, much above what we observe in our sample, selection could only generate
at most around half the effect we observe.
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is driving our findings.20 The regression specifications in the next section deal with
both these concerns.
2.3 Semiparametric and Parametric Estimates of Information Friction Cyclicality
In subsections of 2.3, we further study the time-series properties of IR to verify
that the cyclicality of information frictions, that we found initial evidence of in Sec-
tion 2.2, is robust in a regression setting.
Semiparametric estimates of cyclicality. In our regressions, we will use loan and bor-
rower balance sheet variables as controls. We consider both coefficient magnitudes
and explanatory power as captured by R2. By filtering out information captured in
these variables, we implicitly focus on the soft component of the bank’s information.
To track time-series variation in the predictive precision of IR, we adjust regression
(1) by allowing the coefficients on the bank’s information (IR) to differ each quarter.
This amounts to a semiparametric approach in that we impose no structure on the
time pattern of coefficients. We plot the quarterly coefficient estimates in Figure 5.
Several patterns are apparent in Figure 5. First, there is considerable time-series
variation in the predictive power of IR. Second, this variation is correlated with the
business cycle: both the statistical power and the magnitude of coefficient estimates
are higher during the 2008–09 recession, and again during the second recession start-
ing in 2011, than during the expansionary periods. These results suggest that the
bank’s internal information is better able to sort borrowers by credit quality at times
when the economy is weak, as captured by coefficient size in probit regression.
Parametric estimates of cyclicality. Next, we test whether the cyclicality of bank
information precision is related to business cycle variables in the sense of having a
greater regression coefficient. To do this, we adjust the baseline regression by adding
interactions of IR with a business cycle indicator and estimate:
Defaultt+s = β1.IRt + β2.IRt × Recession Dummyt
+ β3.Controlst + Time Fixed Effects + et, (4)
where we have suppressed the subscript i for firm i. The results, reported in Table 5,
confirm that the differences in patterns between good times and bad times shown in
Figure 4 are statistically significant.21 The coefficients on the interaction estimates
are also economically meaningful. In column (1), the coefficient on IR is estimated
to be −0.071 during normal times, but -0.096 during recessions. This implies, for
20. Using the relative default ratio involves two caveats. First, this methodology penalizes defaults
among highly rated firms (as captured by Dstrong > 0), but pays no attention to nondefaults among poorly
rated firms, comparable to Type 1 and Type 2 errors in statistics. Ignoring incorrectly classified nondefaults
and focusing on incorrectly classified defaults is sensible if missed defaults are much more costly. In credit
decisions, this may be a fair assumption. Second, the relative default ratio DR does not control for variation
in other variables.
21. We use 12-month default as the dependent variable from this point on. Results are similar with 24
months.
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Fig 5. Predicting Default over the Business Cycle.
Notes: This figure displays the β1coefficients from probit regressions of default 12 months ahead on internal ratings.
Coefficients are from the following regression: De f aultwithin 12m = β1t IR ∗ timeF.E. + β2X + i.t + ε. Controls (X)
include credit bureau risk score, collateral and other credit contract characteristics, and accounting variables. Errors are
clustered at the borrower level. The line displays real GDP growth (renormalized). White bars represent coefficients that
are insignificantly different from zero, while light gray, medium gray, and dark gray are significant at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. Shaded areas indicate recession periods.
example, that a drop of three IR steps, that is, one IR group, corresponds to a 24%
increase in default risk during good times but a 32% increase during a recession,
taking into account that the baseline risk is higher during recessions.
Business cycles may hit different parts of the economy differently so in column
(2) we cluster errors by sector instead of firm. This has little impact on significance.
We repeat the regression of column (1) using only observations where IR was freshly
updated. Our results (column (3)) are qualitatively unchanged, although the explana-
tory power of the regression rises when the information compounded into IR is more
recent. This also confirms that stickiness of internal ratings, potentially implying that
IR produced in good times survive through bad times, is not driving our results.
We also reestimate equation (4) using a polynomial or rating grade dummies in-
stead of IR. Table 5, columns (4)–(5) and Tables A3 show that allowing for nonlin-
earities preserves our findings but does not improve on capturing the business cycle
properties of IR. Even when using “Credit slack” or the Credit Bureau Credit Score
(CBCS) instead of IR, the results are qualitatively unchanged (columns (6) and (7)–
(8)). Column (7) also makes clear that the countercyclicality of IR is maintained when
we even include CBCS; hence countercyclical quality of IR is not (exclusively) driven
by the compounded hard information.
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TABLE 6
Explanatory power of hard and soft information over the business cycle
Probit OLS
Sample / Estimation method Expansion Recession Expansion Recession
Independent variable
Internal rating (IR) 5.1 22.7 1.3 11.1
Credit score (CBCS) 5.6 5.9 3.3 5.4
IR and CBCS 7.8 23.6 5.4 13.4
Marginal contribution of IR 2.1 18.6 2.1 8.0
Notes: This table reports the explanatory power of regressions predicting future defaults (similar to Table 4) using the same controls as in
specification (2) in Table 4. Columns (3) and (4) present the averageR2 for the linear probability models; columns (1) and (2) McFadden’s
pseudoR2 for probit models (oneminus the ratio of the log likelihoodwith no control variables to the log likelihoodwith controls). Regressions
were estimated separately for expansions (columns (1) and (3)) and recessions (columns (3) and (4)). The first three rows present measures
of statistical fit for regressions including the explanatory variables identified in the row headings. The last row reports the marginal increase
in R2 and pseudo R2 due to IR, that is, the difference between the row labeled “credit score and IR” and the row labeled “credit score.”
The above results imply that ratings contain more information about default risk
during recessions than they do in good times. These findings are consistent with the
rise in coefficient size during bad times that was generated by the quarter-by-quarter
regressions displayed in Figure 5.
An additional measure of internal ratings’ cyclical ability to explain defaults is
provided by R2. While coefficient magnitudes reflect the magnitude of the difference
in default risk between borrowers at different levels of IR, comparisons of R2 reflect
what fraction of total variation in default risk can be explained by IR. If the informa-
tion contained in IR is more useful for predicting defaults in recessions, the R2 should
be higher.
To examine the variation in explanatory power, we estimate monthly regressions
in recession and nonrecession periods. To simplify the setting, we focus on the
contributions of the CR and the internal rating.22 On the one hand, the CR corre-
sponds most closely to the standard notion of hard information, since it is a numer-
ical variable, publicly available for a nominal fee. On the other hand, the internal
rating incorporates both hard information and the bank’s own soft information. In
Table 6, we report the average R2 for OLS regressions and pseudo R2 for probit
regressions.23
The first row of Table 6 shows that the R2 from internal ratings is several times
higher during recessions than outside of recessions: 11% versus 1.3%.24 The model
fit is also considerably better using the pseudo R2: 23% during recessions versus 5%
outside recessions. Credit scores also generate higher explanatory power in recessions
22. Results are qualitatively similar with more controls.
23. Unlike the OLS statistic R2, the pseudo R2 cannot be interpreted as the share of variation explained
by explanatory variables in the regression. Because we use probit regressions for our regression tests, we
report the pseudo R2 measure for completeness.
24. Throughout, when comparing the measures of statistical fit, we focus on economic significance.
Based on the standard deviation of R2 statistics from the regressions, this difference is significant at the
1% level (even if we take into account that monthly regression statistics are correlated).
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than outside of recessions, but the difference is small. Finally, we look at the marginal
contribution to the explanatory power that internal ratings offer over and above CR,
that is, the difference in R2 between a model with CR alone and one that also includes
internal ratings. We find that the bank information appears more important during
recessions.
Together, this set of results points to superior information and greater predic-
tive power of internal bank ratings during recessions. We conclude that infor-
mation about borrowers is not less precise, and is likely more precise, in bad
times.
3. MECHANISMS
In this section, we use a set of specifications to distinguish between some alterna-
tive theories of countercyclical bank information quality.
3.1 Changes in the Borrower Pool as a Driver of Information Friction Cyclicality
First, we consider if cyclical variation in the mix of old and new borrowers
could produce better information for the bank in recessions. The default risk of a
new borrower may be more difficult for the bank to assess than the risk of exist-
ing borrowers. If banks get relatively more new borrowers in good times, the av-
erage precision of credit quality signals will be worse as the composition of bor-
rowers becomes less favorable (Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006). This means that
changes in the borrower pool could potentially be a key mechanism behind our
results.
We examine this hypothesis by separating borrowers into new and old ones. We
define new borrowers as those that appeared in the bank’s database for the first time
during the past 12 months. On average, around 10% of borrowers are new, through-
out the sample period. The highest share of new borrowers is observed in the first
half of 2006 (17.6%) and early 2007 (14.1%), while the lowest share of new bor-
rowers occurs in the second half of 2011 (7.4%) and late 2012 (6.9%). We reesti-
mate regressions for existing clients only. The results in Table 7, columns (1) and (5)
make clear that the cyclicality patterns for new borrowers are qualitatively as those
for the full sample. Regressions using credit slack generate qualitatively very similar
results (see Appendix 2). The bank is better able to predict default among existing
borrowers in recessions. The patterns we observe are thus not an artifact of time vari-
ation in the mix of old and new bank clients.25 We conclude that the Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez (2006) mechanism does not appear quantitatively important in
our data.
25. We have also estimated results for new borrowers only. The sample is smaller, and significance
slightly reduced. Coefficient estimates are similar.
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Fig 6. Proportion of Borrowers being Assessed by Quarter.
Notes: This figure shows the share of borrowers that are being reviewed by a loan officer in each quarter. The dotted line
shows the average share of borrowers (four quarters rolling). Nobs = 592,306.
3.2 Time-Varying Screening Frequency as a Driver of Information Friction
Cyclicality
Another concern may be that banks exerts more effort in bad times, and so produce
a better signal, even if the information environment does not make it easier to distin-
guish between borrowers. Typical models of bank lending focus on the precision of
banks’ information, not how hard that information is to come by. Ruckes (2004) pre-
dicts that screening of borrowers is less important in good times, and we thus expect
lower precision in those times. The only measure in our data that is related to screen-
ing intensity is the frequency with which the bank reevaluates the internal rating of
each borrower.26
In Figure 6, we plot the fraction of firms being subject to an evaluation by quarter.
The figure displays pronounced seasonality in the monitoring frequency, with a large
peak in the fourth quarter of each year. This seasonality appears to increase over
time, so that more and more of the bank’s evaluations are done at the end of the
year. Importantly, for our purposes, there appears to be no time pattern in the overall
frequency of assessments by year. The increasing activity in the last quarter of each
26. Note that this information on monitoring frequency cannot help detect if loan officer skills deterio-
rate in booms, as Berger and Udell (2004) predict, or if credit officers work harder each time they evaluate
a borrower—for example, because they are more risk-averse, as in Cohn et al. (2015).
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year is offset by reduced activity in the other three quarters. Although the evidence
against cyclical variation in screening intensity is weak, we cannot detect differences
in monitoring frequency over the business cycle. Banks may increase intensity of
screening (and monitoring) while the number of evaluations is fixed, by, for example,
hiring more officers, hiring better officers, or providing stronger incentives. However,
the fixed frequency suggests that the improved ability to detect risk during recessions
is not mechanically driven by reassessing borrowers more often.27
3.3 Loan Officer Effort as a Driver of Information Friction Cyclicality
Finally, we consider if loan officer effort may be driving our results. If the counter-
cyclical quality of borrower information were unique to banks’ internal ratings and
not shared by other measures of creditworthiness, then this would cast doubt on our
conclusion that information frictions are countercyclical. To verify this, we estimated
time-varying coefficients as in equation (4) using the credit bureau score instead of
the internal rating. The credit bureau score is constructed mechanically using a large
amount of data, making it a good example of “hard” data in the sense of Stein (2002).
In Table 5, we first allowed the coefficient for both IR and credit bureau score to
differ during recessions (column (7)) and then for both IR polynomial and credit bu-
reau score (column (8)). The coefficient on the interaction term between the recession
indicator and the credit bureau score is positive and significant in both regressions.
These results suggest that both “hard” and “soft” information predict defaults better
during recessions than during better times. Notably, this is consistent with the pattern
in Figure 4, where the default prediction based on credit bureau score alone does bet-
ter in recessions. The observed cyclicality in the precision of hard information is a
significant finding for several reasons. Many of the theories about cyclical informa-
tion quality often concern bank productivity or effort in information production (e.g.,
Dell’Ariccia and Marquez 2006 as well as Ruckes 2004). These theories cannot ex-
plain why a mechanical measure like the credit bureau score works best in recessions.
That CR based solely on hard information, where monitoring plays no role, display
the same business cycle properties makes clear that variation in effort through inten-
sified monitoring in bad times is not the dominating driver behind the countercyclical
information frictions between banks and their borrowers.
4. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS
In this section, we verify if our main results are robust to a series of alternative
specifications and for subsets of the data.
27. As an additional robustness test (not reported), we have estimated our regressions using only
fourth-quarter observations or only observations with fresh reviews. Fourth-quarter results are very similar
to those for the full sample.
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4.1 Use Only Updated Internal Ratings
First, we already verified if our results may be driven exclusively by the stickiness
of the internal ratings. A possible concern could be that the predictive power of the
internal ratings is driven by long-term considerations of loan officers or by long-term
characteristics of the ratings. Loans officers may, for example, have been targeting
longer-term behavior of loans even though ratings are explicitly intended to capture
the 12-month default risk or collect (more) information at occasions where ratings
are in fact updated.
We address these concerns by restricting our data set to observations where the loan
officer changed the rating in the previous period, thereby ensuring that the ratings
reflect newly collected information. We then rerun the baseline regression of Table 4,
column (2) and Table 5, column (2). The results from this regression are displayed
in Table 4, column (6) and Table 5, column (3).28 We find that the results remain
qualitatively unchanged. The explanatory power of the regressions appears to rise
slightly, reflecting the fact that newly updated ratings are more informative. Thus, we
conclude that the countercyclicality of information frictions was not an artifact of IR
used in bad times having been created in good times.
4.2 Types of Information
The increased informativeness of IR that we document implies that some combina-
tion of the different information sources of banks become more predictive of defaults
in recessions. Two key distinctions are private versus public (i.e., how widely is infor-
mation disseminated) and hard versus soft (i.e., can the information be transmitted
easily). The relative contribution of the different types of information to the cycli-
cality of frictions will not alter our main result. Most theories do not differentiate
explicitly between types of information (e.g., Ruckes 2004), but it is relevant to ap-
preciate our conclusions, as it could inform us about the generality of our findings
and external validity.
The results in Table 5 (columns (6)–(7)) already bear on this question. Hard,
public information compounded in CR represents some of the cyclicality pattern
we observe. Even after controlling for CBCS, IR still have stronger predictive
power in recessions. We can interpret the coefficients on IR in these regressions as
the capturing soft, private information. Soft, private information thus plays a role
as well.
Next, we go one step further and allow the coefficient on all time-varying control
variables to have different slope in recessions. Table 8, column (3), shows that the
bigger predictive power of IR in recessions is preserved, although with lower statis-
tical significance. Together these tests confirm the cyclical effects of both soft and
hard information.
28. We also reran the baseline regression for defaults over a 24-month horizon (not displayed but
available from the authors upon). Results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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To investigate this issue further, we therefore do an additional test.29 We create
a subsample of observations with freshly updated CBCS (without forcing IR to be
updated) and run the same regression as in Table 5, column (3).30 The coefficients
of CBCS and [CBCS × recession dummy] are nearly unchanged. (Table 8, column
(2)). This confirms that our finding that hard, public information contributes to the
cyclicality is also robust to controlling for sluggish updating (of CBCS).
4.3 Exclude Borrowers Who Were Granted New Credit
In this section, we address the concern that granting credit reduces a borrower’s
credit risk, and that higher ratings therefore cause lower credit risk (through the chan-
nel of new credit). Firms with better IRmay be less likely to default because they later
on obtain more credit from their bank. In the short run, new credit almost surely re-
duces the default probability; the long-run impact, however, is more ambiguous. This
mechanism could provide an alternative driver as well as interpretation of our finding
that the accuracy of ratings varies over time, assuming new credit is more important
to borrower’s short-term credit risk in recessions. We attempt to deal with this in our
baseline specifications by including controls for the level of credit from the bank,
as well as the debt from all other sources. However, outstanding credit is measured
before the default variable. If IR predicts new loans after the balance sheet date, but
before defaults are measured, reverse causality might still play a role. To test whether
this is quantitatively important, we drop from our sample all firms that receive new
credit in the next 12 months from our bank (Table 7, columns (2) and (6)) or any
bank (Table 7, columns (3) and (7)) in auxiliary regressions.31 The coefficients are
statistically indistinguishable from those in the main specification.32
The variation in the predictive power of IR over the cycle is therefore not driven
by new credit flows but is indeed likely reflecting variation in the banks’ ability to
assess credit risk.
4.4 Variation in Borrower Size and Industry Composition
Changes in the firm size and industry composition of the borrower pool could make
it harder to measure credit risk during recessions. Small firms are opaquer and may
be less well understood by the bank because they have less detailed accounting data
and it is worth less to the bank to spend resources on assessing their performance and
prospects.
29. We also created a new subsample where both IR and CBCS are freshly updated. Unfortunately, this
reduces the sample size from 37,454 (11,842 firms) with fresh IR to 5,559 (4,241 firms) with both fresh IR
and CBCS (this is across all periods, that is, spread out over both good and bad times). Because there are
few firms that have simultaneous updates of IR and CBCS in both good and bad times, it is impossible to
separately identify the recession effect of IR while ensuring that all information types are freshly updated.
30. We repeat the results from Table 5, column (3) in Table 8, column (1) to facilitate comparison.
31. Since the borrowers’ credit accounts were originally expressed in euros, we allow for a 10% fluc-
tuation in order to avoid picking up exchange rate fluctuation (a 5% cutoff delivered the same results).
32. Regressions using credit slack generate qualitatively similar results (see Table A2, column (1)).
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Small firms make up a large share of our sample, and if their share is time-varying
then this could affect the bank’s inferred precision in booms and recessions. We
test this issue by estimating our regressions separately for small and large firms. In
Table 7, columns (4) and (8), we report regression results for the subset of firms with
10 employees and up. These firms represent most of the credit volume in our sample
but make up less than half of all firms. The coefficients are similar in magnitude but
are less precisely estimated compared to the full sample.33
In additional robustness tests not reported here we run separate regressions for
seven broad industry groups: retail, hotel/restaurant, transportation/communication,
financial services, health services, social services, and personal services. Except for
financial services, which has very few borrowers, the cyclicality results are present
in each industry.
4.5 More Controls
In our main regressions (Table 5, column (6)), we use CBCS, which is a statistical
credit rating exploiting all balance sheet information, as a sufficient statistic for all
available hard information, including all financial statement data, in order to achieve
parsimoniousness. We also run two extra regressions with an expanded set of con-
trols. First, we interact all controls with the recession dummy (Table 8, column (3)).
Our results remain unchanged although the precision of our parameter estimate is
somewhat reduced (10% level) when the number of controls doubles. We also run
a regression with an expanded set of controls (Table 8, column (4)). When we ex-
pand the number of controls our parameter of interest maintains its sign but loses its
significance.
4.6 Cyclical Variation in the Rating Distribution
One concern could be that the bank does not truly have better information in re-
cessions but that more firms tend to have worse ratings in recessions. If lower ratings
have greater predictive accuracy, then one might argue that greater predictive accu-
racy is an artifact of the rating system or “natural.”
Our sample period is too short to be able to compare the cyclical quality of infor-
mation between rating grades. However, if the bank were better at predicting default
risk for worse rated firms, this would preserve our conclusions. The distribution of
ratings is very stable through the cycle, however. The absence of cyclical variation in
ratings, shown in Figure 7, is common in credit evaluation systems, and for banks’
internal rating systems in particular, in line with the intentions of the Basel II, III, and
IV regulations.
33. In regressions using credit slack the business cycle interaction term loses significance for large
firms, suggesting that credit slack is more informative for smaller firms than for larger firms (Table A2,
column (3)).
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Fig 7. Distribution of Borrowers over Rating Grades by Month.
Notes: This figure shows the share of borrowers that are located in a particular rating grade by month. Ratings have been
condensed so that 7−, 7, and 7+ are all placed into 7, etc. Nobs = 592,306.
4.7 Regulatory Changes
Our results may be impacted by regulations that affect how banks assign ratings.
The banking industry in Sweden, as elsewhere around the world, has been subject
to new regulation in the last decade. Recent reforms in banking regulation have in-
creased the implicit cost of assigning low ratings, because low ratings raise the cap-
ital requirements when banks use the IRB approach for capital.34 This generates an
incentive to improve ratings (Behn, Haselmann, and Vig 2014), which might make
them less precise by adding noise. Could this in some way drive our finding that the
precision of bank credit information varies with the business cycle?
In Sweden, the Basel II rules were introduced in February 2007, allowing the
largest banks to use the IRB approach model after an approval procedure. Transi-
tional rules, however, meant that the old Basel I requirements constituted a floor
for capital requirements, initially until 2009 and later through an extension until the
enactment of Basel III regulations. The new Basel II rules were expected to generally
raise requirements on both large corporations as well as small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) (Finansinspektionen 2006). To the extent that ratings would
have become noisier over the 2007–09 period, this would have led to a deteriorating
34. Under the IRB approach, banks’ own ratings are inputs into determining capital requirements.
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performance of internal bank ratings at the exact time when we find that the ratings
precision improves. Regulation is therefore unlikely to explain our results.35
5. CONCLUSIONS
The supply of corporate bank loans is highly procyclical. In principle, this could
reflect information frictions between lenders and borrowers becoming worse in re-
cessions. In general, assessing borrowers’ creditworthiness is a key challenge facing
lenders. Could the magnitude of this challenge be cyclical, making it harder to assess
cross-sectional variation in risk, thus contributing to low lending volumes in reces-
sions?
Our empirical results suggest that this explanation of loan supply cycles is not sup-
ported by the data. When studying the complete corporate loan portfolio of a large
Swedish cross-border bank, which follows the Basel Committee’s IRB approach, cov-
ering two recessions matched with balance sheet data and CR from Sweden’s bank-
owned credit bureau, we instead find the opposite: corporate borrower defaults are
better predicted during recessions. This is true using hard information measures as
well as soft information, indicating that the cyclicality of information quality does
not result from time-variation in loan officer effort.
Our results also suggest that cyclical patterns in the quality of bank borrower as-
sessments do not reflect cyclical variation in the composition of the borrower pool, for
example, the arrival of new, unknown firms or the prevalence of small, more opaque
businesses. We as well rule out that our results could be contaminated by reverse
causality related to the extension of new loans.
Our results are based on data from a large, cross-border Swedish bank that applies
the Basel Committee’s IRB approach. Small banks may focus on different borrower
sizes and therefore on average use different lending technologies with potentially
different cyclical properties or. However, the cyclical patterns we document apply
to small firms and across industries, suggesting that they may be operating broadly
across banks’ corporate lending. Regarding external validity, we note that Swedish
firms have very stable banking relationships with a very low “exit” rate. This may
be of importance when relating our findings to economies where switching and/or
occurs frequently.
A key implication of our findings relates to the links between macro-economic
fluctuations and financial frictions. Our findings suggest that the large swings in cor-
porate credit availability probably do not reflect meager information about borrowers
in bad times. Our results also imply that countercyclical capital requirements can be
motivated as a tool to address the reduced precision of banks’ internal ratings in good
economic times.
35. During our sample period, no other reform of similar broad importance for internal ratings was
introduced.
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